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Abstract
The growing interest for adversarial examples,
i.e. maliciously modified examples which fool a
classifier, has resulted in many defenses intended
to detect them, render them inoffensive or make
the model more robust against them. In this pa-
per, we pave the way towards a new approach
to defend a distant system against adversarial ex-
amples, which we name the luring of adversarial
perturbations. A component is included in the
target model to form an augmented and equally
accurate version of it. This additional compo-
nent is designed to be removable and to give false
indications on the way to fool the target model
alone: the adversary is tricked into fooling the
augmented version of the target model, and not
the target model. We explain the intuition of our
defense with the principle of the luring effect,
inspired by the notion of robust and non-robust
features, and experimentally justify its validity.
Eventually, we propose a simple prediction strat-
egy which takes advantage of this effect, and show
that our defense scheme on MNIST, SVHN and
CIFAR10 can efficiently thwart an adversary us-
ing state-of-the-art attacks and allowed to perform
large perturbations.
1. Introduction
The machine learning pipeline can be threatened at every
stage (training and inference) with attacks targeting the con-
fidentiality, integrity or accessibility of a machine learning
system (Papernot et al., 2016). In particular, it has been
unveiled that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
examples (Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2014), i.e.
maliciously modified examples which fool a neural network
based system. Many directions have been explored to ex-
plain this phenomenon (Tanay & Griffin, 2016; Gilmer et al.,
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2018; Schmidt et al., 2018; Ford et al., 2019; Ilyas et al.,
2019), becoming a growing concern as adversarial exam-
ples seem inherent to complex high-dimensional problems
(Shafahi et al., 2019).
In parallel, Machine Learning-based services and applica-
tions which let the users query them without revealing in-
ternal details1 are likely to become increasingly widespread.
Defending a distant system against adversarial examples
can be achieved directly via leveraging one of the existing
proactive defense scheme (Madry et al., 2018; Cohen et al.,
2019; Zhang & Wang, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). Another
defense strategy is to add a reactive mechanism to the distant
system (Liao et al., 2018; Pang et al., 2018; Samangouei
et al., 2018) to detect or purify adversarial examples.
In this paper, we propose a conceptually innovative defense
scheme in the realistic situation where an adversary aims
at attacking a distant target network, being unaware of the
existence of a defense mechanism. Our method consists
in augmenting the target neural network with a removable
additional component, providing the adversary with this aug-
mented version instead of the target network. The additional
component will act as a lure for adversarial perturbations, in
the sense that it is specifically designed so that adversarial
examples crafted to fool the augmented version of the target
network will not fool the target network or fool it in a dif-
ferent way. Relying on the observations that transferability
of adversarial perturbations between two models occurs be-
cause these models rely on similar non-robust features (Ilyas
et al., 2019), we design the additional component such that
the augmented network exploits useful features of the target
network, but non-robust features of the augmented and tar-
get networks require different input modifications in order
to be flipped. To our knowledge, this is the first defense
scheme exploiting the idea of presenting to the adversary
different non-robust useful features as a lure, opening a new
interesting direction for adversarial research. Indeed, our
method does not aim at making the target model relying
more on useful robust-features as with proactive schemes
(Ilyas et al., 2019; Kaur et al., 2019), nor tries to anticipate
perturbations which directly target the useful non-robust fea-
tures of the target model as with reactive defense schemes.
We define two metrics and perform evaluations to properly
1See https://www.ximilar.com or https://www.clarifai.com.
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identify the contribution of our method. We then evaluate
our defense scheme on MNIST (Lecun et al., 1998), SVHN
(Netzer et al., 2011) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) and
show that it can efficiently thwart adversaries using state-of-
the-art transferability attacks and allowed to sorely perturb
the inputs. We show for example that for a large l∞ pertur-
bation of 0.08 on SVHN, an adversary using the powerful
DIM-TI attack (Dong et al., 2019) to craft transferable ad-
versarial examples can only reduce the adversarial accuracy
of the target model to 0.48.
2. Background
Notations A neural network classifies an input x ∈ X
to a label M(x) ∈ {1, 2, ...C}. The scoring function of
the network is the softmax function and is denoted as F :
X → [0, 1]C , and the pre-softmax function (the logits) is
denoted as ` : X → RC . Given a pair of input/response
(x, y) ∈ X×RC , the network is trained via the minimization
of the loss function J(w, x, y) with respect to w, which
denote the network weight parameters. Here, we consider
the cross-entropy loss. Given a function g : X → RC , gi(x)
denotes the ith element of g(x).
Adversarial examples From a clean observation x of
ground-truth label y, well-classified by the target network,
an adversarial example x′ is a maliciously perturbed ver-
sion of x such that it is classified as a precise class t 6= y
(targeted attacks) or any class y′ 6= y (untargeted attacks),
while still being labeled in class y by an oracle (i.e. still look-
ing benign). An adversarial example x′ is often searched by
enforcing an upper bound on a distance D(x, x′) between
the clean example x and the adversarial example x′ as a
constraint, or integrating the minimization of D(x, x′) as
part of the optimization objective of the adversary. D is
usually a distance derived from the l∞, l2, l1, l0 norm or
even the Wasserstein distance (Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Chen et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2018; Croce & Hein, 2019;
Wong et al., 2019). However, adversarial examples may
also exploit translations, rotations, or semantic modifica-
tions of the clean images (Engstrom et al., 2019; Joshi et al.,
2019). The methods to craft adversarial examples can be
divided broadly in three categories. Gradient-based meth-
ods assume that the adversary has access to the gradients
of the target network (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Chen et al.,
2018; Dong et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2018; Rony et al.,
2019; Wang et al., 2019). Score-based methods assume
that the adversary has only access to the scoring function
outputs (Chen et al., 2017; Uesato et al., 2018; Cheng et al.,
2019; Guo et al., 2019; Su et al., 2019; Tu et al., 2019)).
Decision-based methods assume that the adversary has
only access to the label outputs (Brendel et al., 2018; Ilyas
et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2019).
3. Luring defense
3.1. Threat model
A threat model encompasses assumptions about the adver-
sary’s goal, capability and knowledge. Defining a threat
model is a compulsory step to properly define the setting
in which a defense has to be evaluated. The adversary
goal is to fool the distant model at inference time. We con-
sider untargeted attacks as these attacks are more likely to
succeed than targeted ones. The adversarial knowledge cor-
responds to the realistic setting where the adversary only has
a black-box access to the distant model. He is unaware of
the architecture of the target network and the defense com-
ponent. However he can query the distant model without
restriction. The adversarial capability is an upper bound
 of the distance ‖x′ − x‖∞. Some attack methods are de-
signed to allow to control the l∞ norm of the adversarial
perturbation while other ones do not explicitly allow it. For
the fairness of the defense evaluation and to match with the
threat model defined, we project each crafted adversarial
example x′ on the l∞ ball of center x and radius  before
inference being performed by the distant system.
3.2. Principle
Objectives and design. Our defense consists in a network
P mapping an input x ∈ X to P (x) ∈ X , appended to the
already trained target network M before the input layer,
such as the distant system will answer M ◦ P (x) when fed
with input x. The additional component P is designed and
trained to reach a twofold objective:
• adding P does not alter the decision for a clean exam-
ple x of ground truth label y: M ◦P (x) = M(x) = y;
• according to an adversarial example x′ crafted to fool
M ◦ P , M does not output the same label than M ◦ P :
M ◦ P (x′) 6= M(x′). In the best case, M(x′) = y.
To explain the intuition of our method, we follow the feature-
based framework proposed in (Ilyas et al., 2019) where a
feature f is a function from the input space X to R. A
feature can be useful and robust or useful and non-robust.
More precisely, M learns useful features, which are features
predictive of the true label at some level, on which it relies
on to perform prediction. Among these useful features,
considering (x, y) ∈ X × {1, ..., C} and a set of allowed
perturbations ∆, a feature is said robust up to a certain
level γ if for any perturbation δ ∈ ∆, f(x+ δ) stays more
predictive of the label y up to this level γ. On the contrary, a
useful feature is said non-robust if f(x+ δ) is not predictive
of the true label y at any level: f has been flipped. An
adversary which aims at fooling a model will thus perform
perturbations to the inputs to influence the useful features
learned by this model which are not robust with respect to
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Figure 1. Luring effect. x′ fools M ◦ P by flipping a non-robust
feature f◦P ∈ F∗,NRM◦P . However, f can be a robust feature learned
by M , then M is not fooled, or a non-robust feature learned by
M but switched differently than f ◦ P , resulting in fooling M
towards a different adversarial label.
the perturbation he is allowed to apply. See (Ilyas et al.,
2019) for more details.
We denote F∗M the set of useful features learned by M . We
consider a set of allowed perturbations ∆ and a level γ such
that we note F∗,RM and F∗,NRM respectively the set of robust
and non-robust features learned by M relatively to ∆ and γ.
An adversary aiming at fooling M ◦ P will alter function
compositions of the form f ◦ P where f ∈ F∗M . These
function compositions are the non-robust useful features
of M ◦ P , whose set is denoted F∗,NRM◦P . Based on the
observations that transferability of adversarial perturbations
between two models occurs because these models rely on
similar non-robust features (Ilyas et al., 2019), ensuring the
lowest transferability between M ◦ P and M is equivalent
to ensuring that for f ◦ P ∈ F∗,NRM◦P , we have at best f ∈
F∗,RM (∆ is sufficient to flip f ◦ P with respect to γ but
not sufficient for f ), or f ∈ F∗,NRM but f ◦ P and f vary
differently enough with respect to input variations, so that
the adversarial label is not the same when fooling M ◦ P
or M alone (f and f ◦ P are not influenced the same way
with respect to ∆ and γ). P has to induce what we call the
luring effect: the adversary is tricked into modifying input
values in some way to flip useful and non-robust features
of M ◦ P , and these modifications are either without effect
on the useful features of M , or flip the non-robust features
of M in a different way. An illustration of this effect is
presented in Figure 1.
Training the luring component. To achieve this goal,
considering that what is initially given by M is “class A is
predicted, class B is the second possible class”, we want
M ◦ P to result in “class A is predicted, the higher confi-
dence given to class A, the smaller confidence given to class
B”. Conceptually, as the direction of confidence towards
classes is forced to be strongly different for M ◦ P and M ,
we hypothesize that useful features of the two classifiers
should behave differently to input variations. Despite its
simplicity, as it will be verified experimentally, this idea is
effective to have M ◦P and M behaving similarly for clean
examples but differently for adversarial examples.
In order for M ◦ P to induce this behavior, we consider the
following loss function to train the defense component P ,
where we denote θ its parameters.
Given an input-label pair (x, y) ∈ X × {1, ..., C}:
L(θ, x, y) =− λ(`M(x)P θ(x)− `aP θ(x))
+max(0, `P θb (x)− `M(x)P θ(x))
(1)
where ` denotes the logits of M , ` P the logits of M ◦ P ,
a is the index of the second maximum value of `, and b
the index of the second maximum value of ` P . The first
line of Equation 1 maximizes the gap between the logits
of M ◦ P corresponding to the first and second biggest
unscaled confidence score given by M . This part of the loss
formalizes the goal of changing the direction of confidence
bewteen M ◦ P and M . The second line is necessary to
ensure good classification. Indeed, using only the first part
does not ensure that `M(x)P θ(x) is the highest logit value.
The parameter λ > 0 allows to control the trade-off between
ensuring good accuracy and shifting confidence direction.
We highlight the fact that an alternative loss function given
by L′(θ, x, y) = −(`M(x)P θ(x)− `P θb (x)) (i.e. maximiz-
ing the gap between the two logits of M ◦ P corresponding
to the biggest and second biggest logits given by M ◦ P ), is
less optimal for training. Indeed, the second biggest class
given by M ◦P is not necessarily the same as the one given
by M . A comparison of results between our loss function
and this variant is presented in Supplementary Material C.
3.3. Illustration
We consider a three-class classification problem. Inputs are
12× 12 gray-scale images whose values range in [0, 1]. The
task is to recognize the presence of non-zero elements in
three different and separate locations of the picture with
an additional zone where no element can appear. The toy
data set is built by generating gray-scale pictures with pixels
value ranging from 0.3 to 0.7 in the three distinct regions of
the input space (see Figure 2 for examples).
To better visualize the mechanism behind our defense,
since P acts at the input surface of M , we introduce
D = {1, ..., dim(X )} the set of directions. Let f ∈ F∗M
be a useful feature M has learned, we define the two fol-
lowing sets: Df,X =
{
d ∈ D | ∀x ∈ X , ∂f∂xd (x) 6= 0
}
and
Df,P (X ) =
{
d ∈ D | ∀x ∈ X , ∂f◦P∂xd (x) 6= 0
}
which corre-
spond respectively to the set of directions f is sensible to
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Figure 2. Class locations: The white area denotes the class zone,
the black area denotes the other classes zone, and the grey area de-
notes the neutral zone (top). Input example for each class (middle).
P mapping for each class (bottom)
and the set of directions f ◦ P is sensible to. In the scope
of the luring effect, P is trained to increase the number of
directions in:
• D0f =
{
d ∈ Df,P (X )\Df,X
}
: the adversary modifies
input values to fool M ◦ P to which M is not sensible
to.
• D′f =
{
d ∈ Df,P (X ) ∩ Df,X | ∂f◦P∂xd (x) 6=
∂f
∂xd
(x)
}
:
the adversary modifies input values which have differ-
ent effects on the predicted label for M and M ◦ P .
To go back to the concept of features, the case when f is
robust whereas f ◦ P is not is encompassed both in D0f and
inD′f where ∂f◦P∂xd (x) ·
∂f
∂xd
(x) > 0 but order of magnitudes
between ∂f◦P∂xd (x) and
∂f
∂xd
(x) is different (e.g. f ◦ P is
more sensible than f ). The case when f and f ◦ P are both
non-robust but behave differently is encompassed in D′f
where ∂f◦P∂xd (x) ·
∂f
∂xd
(x) < 0.
We note Iv the set of indices (i, j) corresponding to the
zones of the three classes. We consider the simple case
where each useful feature fi,j : 12×12→ [0, 1] for (i, j) ∈
Iv depends only of the value of the input value at (i, j) and
equals this value, i.e Dfi,j ,12×12 = {i, j} and fi,j(x) =
xi,j . We consider a single layer classifier M affecting for
each class c a score yc =
∑
i,j∈Iv w
c
i,jfi,j(x). For the class
c, the wc values are equal and positive for indices (i, j) in
the zone of the class, and equal and negative for indices (i, j)
in the other zones. We train a component P with respect to
our defense scheme. As the intensity of a pixel models the
importance a feature takes in M ’s prediction, P produces a
Figure 3. Two examples. Top: a: clean example (M(x) = M ◦
P (x) = 3). b: adversarial example crafted on M (M(x′) =
1). c: adversarial example crafted on M ◦ P (M ◦ P (x′) = 1,
M(x′) = 3). d: mapping of the adversarial example crafted on
M ◦ P . Bottom: a: clean example (M(x) =M ◦ P (x) = 1). b:
adversarial example crafted on M (M(x′) = 2). c: adversarial
example crafted on M ◦ P (M ◦ P (x′) = 2, M(x′) = 3). d:
mapping of the adversarial example crafted on M ◦ P .
unique image for each class, which consists of the zone of
presence of each class (see Figure 2).
We consider two illustrative examples presented in Figure 3.
For the first case, from a clean example of class 3, we
craft on M and M ◦ P one untargeted adversarial example
with the PGD attack (Madry et al., 2018): the one crafted
on M ◦ P ends up not fooling M . The second case is
similar except that the clean example belongs to class 1
and we use a targeted attack (PGD) towards class 2. The
adversarial example crafted on M ◦ P actually fools M
towards class 3. For both cases, the adversarial crafting on
M is obvious (column b of Figure 3): decrease pixel values
of the source class and increase values for the other parts.
On the contrary, for the adversarial examples fooling M ◦P
(column c of Figure 3), we observe clear illustrations of the
influence of P . First, some pixels of the neutral zone for
M have been used, showing that for some useful features
fi,j ,Dfi,j ,P (12×12) is larger than {i, j}, i.e. M ◦P relies on
directions d in D0f : directions M is originally not sensible
to. Second, in the active zones, some pixel values of the
target class have not all increased and some pixel values of
the source class have not decreased, illustrating the fact that
M ◦ P relies on directions in D′f : directions with different
influence on the features of M ◦ P and M .
4. Experiments
4.1. Setup
We perform experiments on the MNIST, SVHN and CI-
FAR10 datasets. MNIST consists in 28× 28 gray scale in-
puts and 10 classes. SVHN and CIFAR10 consist in 32×32
color images and 10 classes. For MNIST, we train a target
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model with the same architecture as proposed by Madry et al.
(2018). For SVHN and CIFAR10, we train a target model
with an architecture inspired from VGG (Simonyan & Zis-
serman, 2015). The detailed architectures and training setup
can be found in the Supplementary Material A. Pre-trained
models and the scripts used for these experiments are avail-
able at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/
0e5c3e80-016f-48a1-935d-0c810b83581e/.
4.2. Verification of the luring effect
We start by quantifying and evaluating the luring effect
described above. More precisely, we define two metrics
to measure it and compare our approach to other models
designed to separate the luring effect from other possible
phenomenons:
• the Stack model: M ◦ P is trained as a whole model
with the cross-entropy loss. This model serves as a
baseline for transferability between the different archi-
tectures.
• the Auto model: P is an auto-encoder trained sepa-
rately with binary cross-entropy loss. Auto serves as
another baseline of a component resulting in a “neutral”
mapping from Rd to Rd.
• the C E model: P is trained with the cross-entropy
loss. This architecture illustrates the choice of our loss
function compared to simply train M ◦ P to mimic M .
• the Luring model: our method with loss function as in
Equation 1.
The architectures of the components preprended to the base
network can be found in Supplementary Material B. The
test set accuracy and agreement of these models with the
base model M are presented in Table 1. For CIFAR10, no
Auto model is trained as no autoencoder we tried allows to
reach correct test set accuracy. For MNIST and SVHN, we
set λ = 1. For CIFAR10 we set λ = 0.15.
For an adversarial example x′ fooling M ◦ P , the main
objective of the luring effect is to have M ◦P (x′) 6= M(x′).
To quantify it, we define on the adversarial setX ′ a detection
rate, noted DR(X ′) which is the proportion of adversarial
examples successful on M ◦ P for which M and M ◦ P do
not agree:
DR(X ′) =
∑
x′∈X′ 1MoP (x′)6=y,M◦P (x′)6=M(x′)∑
x′∈X′ 1M◦P (x′) 6=y
(2)
Moreover, we define the Adequation rate, noted Adq(X ′),
which is the proportion of adversarial examples successful
on M ◦ P but not on M :
Adq(X ′) =
∑
x′∈X′ 1M◦P (x′)6=y,M(x′)=y∑
x′∈X′ 1M◦P (x′)6=y
(3)
Table 1. MNIST,SVHN and CIFAR10. Test set accuracy and agree-
ment (augmented and base model agree) of the different architec-
tures.
DATA SET MODEL TEST AGREE
MNIST BASE 0.991 –
STACK 0.98 0.976
AUTO 0.971 0.969
C E 0.982 0.977
LURING 0.974 0.969
SVHN BASE 0.961 –
STACK 0.925 0.913
AUTO 0.950 0.943
C E 0.919 0.907
LURING 0.920 0.917
CIFAR10 BASE 0.893 –
STACK 0.902 0.842
C E 0.860 0.834
LURING 0.853 0.822
We attack the four models with the gradient-based attacks
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), PGD (Madry et al., 2018),
and MIM (Dong et al., 2018) in its l∞ and l2 versions
noted respectively MIM and MIML2. and transfer only
the adversarial examples which are successful for the four
architectures. For each attack, three  values are considered:
0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 for MNIST, 0.03, 0.06 and 0.08 for SVHN,
and 0.02, 0.03 and 0.04 for CIFAR10. For MIMl2, we report
results when adversarial examples are clipped to respect the
threat model with regards to . Other parameters used to run
these attacks can be found in the Supplementary Material D.
In Figure 4, we report both metrics for each attack.
For the three data sets and for every , we notice that the
detection and the adequation rates are the highest with our
luring defense. This agrees with the fact that with the lur-
ing defense, directions d belonging to D0f or D′f are more
numerous as previously seen in our toy example. Moreover,
both metrics decrease much slower as  increases with our
method than with the other considered architectures. Bigger
perturbations target directions d ∈ D0f or directions d ∈ D′f .
We investigate the l0 distortion of adversarial examples
crafted with PGD on the different models. For MNIST (see
Figure 5), the l0 distortion is significantly higher when con-
sidering our method. Moreover, by looking at the gradient
of the P ’s mapping with respect to the input, we note that
in our case P ’s mapping depends of the same pixels than
M relies on for prediction but also a lot of pixels useless for
M ’s prediction, as illustrated in Figure 6. For Auto, modify-
ing P ’s mapping consists almost exclusively on modifying
pixels correctly correlated with the true label, while for the
Luring architecture, it consists also largely to modify pixels
in the background, useless for M . This agrees with the fact
that Df,P (X ) is composed of directions d ∈ D0f .
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Figure 4. Detection Rate (solid line) and Adequation Rate (dashed line) for different attacks.
Figure 5. MNIST. l0 distortion of adversarial examples, depending
on the architecture.
For SVHN and CIFAR10, the l0 distortion is approximately
the same for all the architectures. Indeed, M uses informa-
tion from the whole picture to perform prediction, there is
no constant background as for MNIST. We investigate the
direction of variation of logits with respect to the input. For
Figure 6. MNIST. Clean image, gradient of M loss with respect
to the input (top) and gradient of P ’s mapping with respect to the
input (bottom).
each augmented model, for 1000 test set examples classified
correctly by all the augmented models and the base model,
for each class, we compute the number of directions d for
which ∂`∂xd · ∂` P∂xd < 0. This number is lower for the luring
architecture than the other models for more than 74% of
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Table 2. MNIST. ACMoP , ACM and DAC for different source model architectures.
ARCHITECTURES
STACK AUTO C E LURING
 ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC
FGSM 0.3 0.31 0.82 0.93 0.51 0.79 0.92 0.24 0.86 0.95 0.52 0.93 0.97
0.4 0.19 0.50 0.84 0.31 0.51 0.85 0.14 0.58 0.84 0.26 0.76 0.94
0.5 0.12 0.24 0.80 0.17 0.27 0.85 0.12 0.32 0.76 0.19 0.50 0.89
MIM 0.3 0.0 0.59 0.66 0.0 0.60 0.65 0.0 0.80 0.85 0.11 0.90 0.94
0.4 0.0 0.24 0.42 0.0 0.26 0.36 0.0 0.52 0.64 0.07 0.70 0.82
0.5 0.0 0.10 0.32 0.0 0.10 0.23 0.0 0.28 0.47 0.05 0.46 0.70
DIM 0.3 0.0 0.49 0.6 0.0 0.53 0.6 0.0 0.66 0.73 0.0 0.83 0.88
0.4 0.0 0.19 0.33 0.0 0.13 0.26 0.0 0.33 0.5 0.0 0.57 0.71
0.5 0.0 0.06 0.29 0.0 0.03 0.19 0.0 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.36 0.64
MIM-TI 0.3 0.0 0.39 0.52 0.0 0.40 0.52 0.0 0.5 0.64 0.27 0.85 0.89
0.4 0.0 0.13 0.31 0.0 0.10 0.17 0.0 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.55 0.71
0.5 0.0 0.06 0.26 0.0 0.02 0.08 0.0 0.13 0.31 0.11 0.26 0.46
DIM-TI 0.3 0.0 0.31 0.45 0.0 0.35 0.45 0.0 0.43 0.57 0.13 0.69 0.75
0.4 0.0 0.7 0.24 0.0 0.07 0.17 0.0 0.13 0.31 0.07 0.34 0.45
0.5 0.0 0.03 0.19 0.0 0.00 0.06 0.0 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.16 0.36
Table 3. SVHN. ACMoP , ACM and DAC for different source model architectures.
ARCHITECTURES
STACK AUTO C E LURING
 ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC
FGSM 0.03 0.22 0.63 0.74 0.34 0.54 0.58 0.20 0.71 0.80 0.48 0.96 0.97
0.06 0.08 0.34 0.58 0.21 0.31 0.47 0.07 0.43 0.63 0.50 0.86 0.94
0.08 0.05 0.25 0.56 0.17 0.22 0.46 0.04 0.34 0.58 0.45 0.80 0.92
MIM 0.03 0.02 0.44 0.46 0.01 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.63 0.66 0.0 0.94 0.96
0.06 0.0 0.12 0.15 0.0 0.06 0.08 0.0 0.28 0.36 0.0 0.93 0.96
0.08 0.0 0.06 0.09 0.0 0.02 0.04 0.0 0.18 0.27 0.0 0.89 0.96
DIM 0.03 0.05 0.39 0.42 0.04 0.28 0.30 0.02 0.51 0.54 0.03 0.93 0.95
0.06 0.0 0.09 0.11 0.0 0.06 0.08 0.0 0.18 0.23 0.0 0.87 0.92
0.08 0.0 0.03 0.06 0.0 0.02 0.04 0.0 0.07 0.15 0.0 0.80 0.88
MIM-TI 0.03 0.02 0.33 0.36 0.01 0.20 0.21 0.09 0.49 0.54 0.01 0.85 0.91
0.06 0.0 0.08 0.1 0.0 0.03 0.05 0.0 0.18 0.26 0.0 0.66 0.82
0.08 0.0 0.04 0.07 0.0 0.01 0.02 0.0 0.11 0.2 0.0 0.59 0.78
DIM-TI 0.03 0.04 0.32 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.25 0.03 0.41 0.45 0.11 0.81 0.87
0.06 0.0 0.06 0.09 0.0 0.04 0.05 0.0 0.10 0.18 0.0 0.58 0.71
0.08 0.0 0.03 0.06 0.0 0.02 0.03 0.0 0.06 0.13 0.0 0.48 0.67
examples and 52% respectively on SVHN and CIFAR10.
These proportions rise up to 81% and 85% when not consid-
ering the stacked architecture which is not included in our
threat model as it requires training another model as a whole.
This is an observation towards the fact that for SVHN and
CIFAR10 the effectiveness of our defense is predominantly
due to the fact that there are more directions d ∈ Df,P (X )
which are now in D′f .
4.3. Adversarial results
Our threat model corresponds to a black-box setting where
an adversary is authorized to query without restriction the
full model M ◦ P to craft an adversarial example x′, in
order to fool the distant system composed of M ◦ P and
M . Some score-based and decision-based attacks like ZOO
(Chen et al., 2017), SPSA (Uesato et al., 2018) and HSJ
(Chen et al., 2019) are well-designed for this setting where
gradients are not available. However, these attacks are less
powerful than their gradient-based counterparts and show
poor transferability results. In order to provide a strong eval-
uation of our method, we alleviate the black-box paradigm
to consider a setting where the adversary has a complete
access to the M ◦ P model but is unaware of the defense
scheme. Thus, he aims at crafting on the M ◦ P model
the more transferable adversarial examples. We consider
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) as a baseline single-step
attack, which may show better transferability results than it-
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Table 4. CIFAR10. ACMoP , ACM and DAC for different source model architectures.
ARCHITECTURES
STACK C E LURING
 ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC ACMoP ACM DAC
FGSM 0.02 0.16 0.73 0.81 0.12 0.64 0.68 0.27 0.78 0.82
0.03 0.09 0.57 0.72 5 0.08 0.43 0.51 0.25 0.64 0.74
0.04 0.09 0.45 0.66 0.08 0.38 0.47 0.23 0.55 0.69
MIM 0.02 0.0 0.62 0.64 0.01 0.5 0.53 0.02 0.69 0.72
0.03 0.0 0.33 0.36 0.0 0.24 0.27 0.01 0.47 0.55
0.04 0.0 0.18 0.21 0.0 0.07 0.11 0.0 0.25 0.33
DIM 0.02 0.0 0.52 0.57 0.02 0.43 0.45 0.07 0.62 0.66
0.03 0.0 0.28 0.32 0.0 0.13 0.17 0.0 0.32 0.40
0.04 0.0 0.14 0.17 0.0 0.07 0.1 0.0 0.16 0.27
MIM-TI 0.02 0.0 0.57 0.61 0.01 0.47 0.51 0.02 0.69 0.73
0.03 0.0 0.28 0.32 0.0 0.21 0.25 0.01 0.43 0.51
0.04 0.0 0.15 0.18 0.0 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.27 0.35
DIM-TI 0.02 0.0 0.49 0.52 0.02 0.40 0.43 0.03 0.58 0.64
0.03 0.0 0.24 0.28 0.0 0.15 0.19 0.0 0.30 0.39
0.04 0.0 0.13 0.16 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.0 0.18 0.28
erative ones (Kurakin et al., 2016). We also use MIM (Dong
et al., 2018), designed to improve transferability, as well as
three variants of it, DIM (Xie et al., 2018), MIM-TI (Dong
et al., 2019), and DIM-TI (Dong et al., 2019), specifically
designed to craft strongly transferable adversarial examples.
These attacks are performed on 1000 correctly classified
test set examples, with parameter values tuned for best trans-
ferability results (details in Supplementary Material D).
As our method is designed to have at best M(x′) = y
or at least M ◦ P (x′) 6= M(x′), two different prediction
schemes are viable: (1) one may choose to look at M ’s
prediction only or (2) at the agreement between M and
M ◦P , and perform prediction only if M ◦P and M agree.
As our defense scheme minimizes the number of adversarial
examples which fool M ◦ P and M in the same way, it
optimizes the Detection Adversarial Accuracy (DAC), the
rate of adversarial examples which are either detected or
well-predicted by M , as expressed in Equation 4.
DAC = 1−
∑
x∈X′ 1M◦P (x′)=M(x′),M(x′)6=y
|X ′| (4)
We compare the results considering the same architectures
used to justify the luring effect and the same  bound for
‖x− x′‖∞. For each case, we report DAC and the classical
adversarial accuracy (i.e the standard accuracy but mea-
sured on the adversarial set X ′) noted ACMoP and ACM
respectively on the models M ◦ P and M .
The results are presented in Table 2, 3 and 4 for respec-
tively MNIST, SVHN and CIFAR10. The higher ACM and
DAC values eventually show the pertinence of our defense
scheme. Remarkably on SVHN, for  = 0.08 (the largest
perturbation), adversarial examples tuned to achieve the best
transferability results which reduce ACM to nearly 0 for the
other architectures only reduce ACM to 0.48 against our
approach. The robustness benefits of our defense scheme
against transferred adversarial examples are more observ-
able on SVHN and MNIST than or CIFAR10. However,
the results on CIFAR10 are quite promising in the scope
of a defense scheme which does not require to perform the
training phase as a whole. Indeed, the worst DAC value for
the C E and Luring models are respectively 0.17 and 0.39
for the common l∞ perturbation value of 0.03. Eventually,
we hypothesize that the success of our defense is strongly
correlated with the difficulty of the learning task. When a
too simple task is at stake, it won’t allow much enrichment
of X without causing overfitting. When a somewhat diffi-
cult task is considered, considering that the complexity of P
component does not have to be overwhelming, new useful
features will be hardly discovered.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the Luring defense: a new ap-
proach to improve the robustness of a distant model against
adversarial pertubations, inspired by the notion of robust
and non-robust features. The efficiency of our method is
verified through experiments on three common data sets
against state-of-the-art transferability optimized attacks.
Our method is conceptually innovative as it exploits a new
way of defending a distant system: presenting to the ad-
versary different non-robust features than the ones of the
target model. Technically, it does not need any retraining of
the model, or makes assumptions about the way adversarial
perturbations are designed, or relies on expensive test-time
inference procedures.
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